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No. 81-228-ADX

UNITED
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STATES ~

~

GRACE BRETHERN CHURCH
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No. 81-455-ADX
GRACE BRETHERN

CHURCH ~

v.

orL

UNITED

STATE~
My

postpone

initial

and

reflection,

to

I

United

States

affect

the

also

for

become

Court's

the

treatment

~ ee

in

record

convinced

No .~·767

Lee,

primarily concerns a
case

recommendation

call

have
v.

Federal/Civil

(to
of

be

these

cases

each
the

argued

I

case.

to
Upon

11/2/81)

cases.

could

Although

Lee

Exercise challenge to the FUTA, that

FUTA Establishment

problem.

was

disposition of

implicates a potential Establishment

alleged

Exercise

in

that

appeals present t e opposite situation:
an

this

Timely

now

the

These

a primary concern with

violation with

think

issue.

a

potential

lurking
overlap

Free
is

sufficiently significant to warrant a hold in all three cases
for Lee.
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No. 81-31-ADX
CALIFORNIA et al.
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Timely
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Timely
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2.

No. 81-455-ADX
GRACE BRETHERN CHURCH, et al.

v.
UNITED STATES, et al.
SUMMARY:

Church

constitutionality of
and

groups

the

challenged

the V''Federal Unemployment Tax Act

its California state counterpart.

violate

Timely

Federal/Civil

Establishment

Free Exercise Clause.

Clause

In No.

The DC found

but are

./.:'

81-31,

the
(FUTA)

the

laws

in accord with

the

the State of California

appeals the DC's finding of an Establishment violation.

The SG

-

argues a similar appeal in No : 81-228, but he also asserts the
./

DC lacked jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act (TIA).

In

No. 81-455, the churches contend the FUTA contravenes the Free
Exercise Clause.
FACTS
§§3301-11,

is

AND
a

PROCEEDINGS

tax

levied on employers

percentage of wages paid.
this

federal

liability

federally approved

The

BELOW:

~tate

FUT A ,

26

U. S . C .

and calculated as a

Employers are given a credit against
for

up

to

90%

of

contributions

unemployment compensation funds.

to
All

states have enacted such parallel coverage laws.
The FUTA excludes from coverage services performed "in
the

employ of

churches,
for

or

religious

(A)
(B)

a

church or

convention or

association of

an organization which is operated primarily

purposes

and

which

is

operated,

supervised,

controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention

3.

or

association

of

churches

u.s.c.

26

"

3309 (b) (1).

Cal.'s law contains a similar exclusion.
The Lutheran and the Grace Brethern Churches operate
private

elementary

injunctive

and

and

secondary

declaratory

relief

They

schools.

against

lt

sought

collection

of

the

'"

federal and state taxes levied on waged paid in these schools.

--

The suits were consolidated and the DC determined the TIA,

u.s.c.

§1341,

(DC shall not enjoin state tax if plain, speedy,

and efficient remedy available in state court)
its jurisdiction.
of

tax

making

challenges
however,

relief

In a footnote,

authority

S.G.'s Jur.

was,

"at

mounted

to

at

available
state

authority was

Stmt.

best,

uncertain"

in

Cal.

the DC conceded there was "some" Cal.

iniunctions

were

this

did not remove

Under Cal. law, said the DC,the availability

injunctive

courts.

28

tax

"neither

18a n.l2.

when

constitutional
The

laws.

compelling

DC

nor

said,

recent."

Alternative state remedies--

which might require that the churches pay the tax and later sue
for

refund--were

churches claimed

inadequate,
the

decided

the

D.C.,

because

the

very process of determining whether

the

tax was due violated the First Amendment.
On
were

the

either

(Category

I

(Category

II

merits,
of

schools)
schools)

§3309(b) (1) 's language.
church's favor.

the
1

the
or

court

held

b~orate

1

{Hrectly

were

private

structure

affiliated

excluded

from

schools

that

of

a

church

with

a

church

the

FUTA

under

This decided the Lutheran suit in the

The Grace Brethren suit, however, required the

4.

-

DC to consider religiously oriented schools not controlled by a
church

(Category

included
caused

within

III
the

excessive

schools) ,

which

the

The

court

ruled

FUTA.

church/state

DC

decided
this

entanglement.

It

were

inclusion

consequently

held 26 u.s.c. §3309(b) (1) and its Cal. state counterpart to be
unconstitutional as appJ.ied under the Establishment Clause.
~ fter

the DC had

rendered

its

opinions,

this

Court

decided St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota,
101 s.ct.
legal
that

2142

identity
is

similar

schools.

(1981).

This case held schools do not have a

separate

from

to

a FUTA-exempt church--a holding

the DC's conclusion

regarding Category I

St. Martin did not decide the issue of coverage for

Catogory II and III schools.

See

id. at 2148 n.l2.

did it reach First Amendment issues.

Neither

Id. at 2151.

No. 81-31.
CALIFORNIA'S
compensation

process

The

unemployment

steps:

determination

CONTENTIONS:
occurs

in

two

whether an employer must pay the tax and determination whether
a discharged employee is eligible for benefits.
from the portion of the
benefit

judgment finding entanglement

eligibility process
Any

schools.

We appeal only

entanglement

regarding
that might

employees

of

occur

this

in

in the

religious
process

would be de minimis, as the issue would be whether an employee
knowingly
employers
belief,

violated
can

the

an

establish

question

to

established
work
be

rules

answered

work

incorporating
in

the

Although

rule.

religious

state's

benefit

5.

eligibility
conformed

inquiry

would

not

to church doctrine.

understanding,

understanding.

whether

the

work

The state could be

only in the existence of an
doctrinal

be

individual's

not

in

Consequently

the

the

rule

interested

religious belief or

truth of

state's

that

belief or

inquiry

would

be

purely secular and inoffensive to the Establishment Clause.
CHURCHES'

CONTENTIONS:

complexity of religious faith.

California underestimates the
For instance, religious ideals

1 ike "fervor" cannot be defined precisely.
would

also

resolvable

embroil
only

by

hearing

examiners

religious

Benefit inquiries

in

credibility

examination.

The

issues

DC's

sound

decision requires no further review.
No. 81-228
(1)
because

DC

lacked

jurisdiction

no federal tax on non-profit

institutions

but

state tax.
against

The

requires

that

participating

states

The TIA bars the OC's declaration and

such

a

state

tax

so

long

as

the

levy

a

injunction

churches

have

an

Nonetheless, ~~

adequate remedy ;n state courts--as they do here.

the Secretary of the Treasury needs a definitive interpretation
of

§3309(b)

~

Cf~?

and

urges this Court to reach the merits.
. '•
McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 u.s. 21, 31-32 (1975).
(2)
The DC
erred in fearing that unconstitutionalentanglement would result
from

worker

unemployment
ability

to

benefits

determinations.

compensation laws
establish

whatever

Federal

and

s~~

in no way limit an employer's
work

rules

it

wishes

~

and

to

6.

require

adherence

to

Religious

colleges

1970,

and

the

claim

for

them

have

as

been

churches here

unemployment

a

condition

covered
have

benefits

by

not

employment.

similar

found

that

of

a

laws

single

required

since
actual

inquiry

into

religious doctrines.
CHURCHES'
under

the

requires

CONTENTIONS:

TIA because
exhaustion

administrative

of

statutes

itself

would

state

remedy

cannot,

under

unconstitutional.

have
The

is

administrative

agencies

declare

expensive.

the

The DC had

(1)

been

religiously

churches

here

inadequate.

remedies,

the Cal.

The

jurisdiction
Cal.

but

its

constitution,

administrative review

entangling

protest

an

and

unduly

unconstitutional

taxing procedure, and denial of federal relief will result in
denial of

their

federal

rights.

The churches reiterate

( 2)

their arguments on the merits made in No. 81-31.
No. 81-455
CHURCHES'

CONTENTIONS:

The

DC

incorrectly

said

the

tax on the ministry was indirect and insufficiently burdensome
to violate the Free Exercise Clause.
SG'S CONTENTIONS:
expand

upon

the

unnecessary for

relief

Because the churches do not seek to

awarded

in

the

judgment below,

merit.

In

any

is

them to file a cross-appeal to preserve their

argument that FUTA violates the Free Exercise Clause.
10.5.

it

event,

the

Free

Exercise

claims

are

See Rule
without

7.

DISCUSSION:
under

the

The question of FUTA's constitutionality

Religion

Clauses

is

an

important

issue

left

LA-"

unresolved

in St. Martin.

If the

route Aclear to the merits,

notes of probable jurisdiction would be in order in Nos. 31 and
228.

I agree with the SG that the churches' appeal in No. 455

is unnecessary as it seeks no relief beyond that granted below.

)

..,

See United States v. Raines, 362
The

DC's

treatment

u.s.

of

the

17, 27 n.7 (1960).
TIA

seems

erroneous. 1

Although this probably removes the DC's power to adjudicate the
propriety of the state tax, it does not necessarily impair its
ability to invalidate §3309 (b) (1)

of the federal tax

statute~

1 The DC reasoned state court relief was not adequate to
protect federal constitutional rights because state law barred
all
injunctive
relief
in
tax
suits.
Even making
the
implausible assumption that . this is an ?Ccurate reading of
state law, but se·e DC opn at n.l2 (cited at page 3 of this
memo), state courts must enforce federal rights.
A state law
limitation on a proper remedy for a federal constitutional
injury would be void under the Supremacy Clause because state
court must be capable of granting adequate constitutional
relief. State courts conse uentl do indeed afford the taxpayer 5~
a "fu~ h~ng an
JU 1c1a
determ1na 10n,
osewell v. -- ~ /.~Jj
LaSarlelNat'lJBank, 101 S.Ct. 1221, 1230 (1981), demonstrating ~~
that the TIA bars federal injunctive intervention in this suit. ~4~ ~ - --~
As the SG points out, S.G. Jur. Stmt. at 7 n.7, the ----y~
fact the DC also was asked to provide declaratory relief adds
little to its power.
Although this Court apparently has not
held the TIA proscribes federal tax declaratory judgments,
comments in this area reveal the TIA's policy that "federal
courts stay completely out of the field of anticipatory
adjudication of tax cases • • • • " Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
8 2, 127 ( 19 71) (opinion of JUSTICE BRENNAN) (emphasis added) .
See Rosewell, 101 S .Ct. at 1233-34, 1235 (1981); Great Lakes
Dredge
&
Dock Co.,
319
u.s. 293, 301 (1943).
S1nce
satisfactory state relief is available, the TIA bars the DC
action here.

8

0

it appears (although the papers before the Court do not include
copies of their complaints)
declaratory
provision.

relief
Neither

as

that the churches sought separate

to

does

the

the

validity

federal

of

this

equivalent,

federal

26

u.s.c.

§724l(a), of the TIA obviously remove this action from the DC's
jurisdiction.

The

Stmt. at 78a-86a,

DC

analyzed

this

quest ion,

see

S. G.

Jur.

in a manner sufficiently sound as to render

summary reversal definitely inappropriate.
This suggests the Court may have a clear shot at the
First Amendment merits of §3309(b) (1)

in No. 228.

Because the

vPotential jurisdictional shoals now are not adequately briefed
~----------------

by any of the parties, however, I recommend the Court's action
be limited to postponing a note.
take

I further recommend the Court

this action in all three appeals,

understand

they

are

to

brief

all

to ensure all parties
of

their

arguments.

Unnecessary appeals can be dealt with in the full opinion.
RECOMMENDATION:
appeals.

The Court

I

should

recommend
also

call

postpones
for

the

pleadings can be examined.
There is a response.
10/10/81

Wiley

Opinions in Jur Stmt

in

all

record

three
so

the

Court ................... .

1-·oted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .
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Submitted ............... . , 19 .. .
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM FOR JUSTICE POWELL
Nos. 81-31, 81-228, & 81-455:
California v. Grace Brethern Church
From John

March 30, 1982

Questions Presented
1.

Does the Court have 28

u.s.c.

7

§1252 jurisdiction to

hear this direct appeal?
2.

Did the DC incorrectly interpret the Tax Injunction

Act (TIA) as permitting relief against the state?

,,

'.

2.

3.

If so, can this Court nevertheless reach the merits

of the first amendment issue?
4.

If so, does the Federal Unemployment Tax Act uncon-

stitutionally establish or impair the free exercise of religion?

Discussion
As I mentioned to you earlier, this memo concerns only
the jurisdictional issues in this case and omits discussion of
I organize the

the first amendment merits.

jurisdictional dis-

cussion around three separate questions.
1.

The

Section 1252 Jurisdiction
court 1 s

District

only the state,

order

and not the federal,..,

by

tt-v

A

terms

statute.

declared

invalid

See JS 89a ,[4.

f

Therefore there is a question whether the Court properly has jurisdiction over this appeal, since §1252 permits direct appeals
only when "an Act of Congress" has been declared unconstitutional.

In my view, however, the SG is correct in arguing that the

DC 1 s

judgment properly

is

interpreted as

invalidating §3309 of

the federal FUTA, based on the language in the DC 1 s memos.
JS 2la, 86a & n.39.

See

Consequently I believe the Court does have

jurisdiction to hear this direct appeal.
2.

Tax Injunction Act

The TIA prohibits the federal injunction of state taxes
if "plain, speedy, and efficient remedies" are available in state
court.

The DC here held that the TIA was not a bar because no

such state remedy was available -- for two reasons.

·'

First, ac-

3.

cording

to

the

DC,

the

California Constitution and

statutes bar state tax injunctions.

California

Second, the legal remedies

in state court were inadequate because the very process of paying
the FUTA tax infringed the church schools' religious freedom.
On the first reason, the DC did observe that older California cases make exceptions to California's constitutional and
statutory bar in cases of constitutional challenges.

These cases

make it appear that state injunctive relief is available.
er,

Howev-

the DC rejected the authority of these state cases because

they were "neither compelling nor recent."

SG J.S. at 18a n.12.

This reason alone is inadequate, it seems to me.

The TIA is in-

tended "to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction
to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection
of taxes."
(1981) .

I

Rosewell v.

LaSalle Nat'l Bank,

450

u.s.

503,

522

think the TIA demands more deference to state cases

-------------~-----------------------But I am willing to

suggesting that state remedies are adequate.

concede that the availability of state equitable relief is doubtful as a matter of state law, because I think the TIA remains a

Assuming that state injunctive relief is not available,
I

think California does offer adequate legal relief against un-

constitutional state taxes.

The SG describes the California pro-

cedure in footnote 10 of his brief.
quires the taxpayer

The California process re-

to pay the tax and then sue for

a

refund.

The SG adds the good point that the California process is essentially

similar

.

I

·.~

-~~.'

.

-i,

to

the South Dakota procedure that brought St .

'

'•

4.
Martins Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota to the Court
last Term.

{The pay-and-sue-for-refund technique also was used

in federal court in United States v. Lee {free exercise of Amish
religion not imparied by FUTA and FICA)

{decided 2/23/82)).

cording to the TIA's legislative history

Ac-

{the very brief Senate

---

report is appended to this memo), it appears that such procedures
are precisely the type of adequate state remedies envisioned by

---

the TIA.

The presence of

such an adequate state legal remedy

means the TIA blocks the DC use of injuctive relief against California.
The religious schools claim that legal relief is inadequate.

They demand an injunction.

Their story is that the very

payment of the tax offends their first amendment religious freedom.
I do not think the schools have made their case on this
point.

Their

entanglement

amendment point)

claims

{on the merits of

the

first

focus on the state/church interaction occuring

when a church school fires an employee.
from the schools' initial

T~

of the FUTA tax.

distinct

~

I do not see

how this initial payment creates an irreparable first amendment
injury.

This is especially true in light of the heightened fed-

er al deference owed

to the state taxation mechanism after

the

Court's opinion in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary
{decided 12/1/81) •
I

therefore conclude

that

the TIA indeed should

have

barred the DC's award on injunctive relief against the California

..

..,
.

.
'

5.

taxing authorties.

This raises the issue of whether the TIA also

bars the DC's award of declaratory relief.

The Court has never

squarely held that the TIA encompasses declaratory relief.
its decisions

But

most recently in Fair Assessment -- certainly

have suggested as much.

See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n

~

v. McNary, No. 80-427, slip op. at 10-11.

These suggestions can

be criticized because declaratory relief does not cause one evil
that

the

TIA aimed

to

eliminate:

vital state revenue requirements.

physicial

interference with

But Fair Assessment suggests

that this objection conceives the purpose of the TIA too narrowly.

Indeed,

Fair Assessment avoided a holding on the basis of

the TIA by relying on parallel concerns of comity, which sufficed
to keep the federal courts out of interfering with state tax matters entirely apart from the TIA statutory question.
logic,

Under this

I think there is ample reason to believe that the DC in

this case also lacked authority to subject California's tax mechanism to declaratory attack.
In sum, the TIA barred the DC's award of both injunctive )
and declaratory relief against the state of California.
3.

Can the Court reach the merits in spite of the TIA?
I don't think so.

to

the

intricate

But my reasoning is complicated due

nature of

the FUTA.

Let me begin with some

background.
The FUTA is a
the states.

FUTA imposes a wage tax on all employers, subject to

certain exceptions.

'.~

.

.

....,.

federal program that enlists the aid of

One

except ion

is charitable

org ani za t ions

\

6.

qualifying

for

§3306 (c) (8).

§50l(c) (3)

treatment.

See

FUTA,

26

U.S.C.

As a result of this exception, none of the church

schools in this suit pay or are threatened with any federal FUTA
tax.
The FUTA enlists the aid of the states by making it attractive for them to set up parallel state unemployment insurance
programs.

Employers are permitted to deduct from their federal

FUTA 90% of sums paid to qualifying state programs.

Moreover,

'
the federal government
offers grants to states to pay for their
state

FUTA administration

costs.

These

incentives

are

suffi-

ciently attractive to have induced all the states to establish
state-level unemployment insurance programs designed to meet federal standards.

See 26

u.s.c.

§§3304(a) (6)

&

3309(b).

Oddly, one federal requirement for the states' programs
is that the states' programs must cover employers who escape the
direct

coverage

of

the

federal

FUTA

tax.

For

instance,

the

church schools in this suit are not subject to the federal FUTA
tax, as noted earlier on this page.

But they are subject to the

state programs, if the state programs are adapted (as all in fact
are) to meet the minimum federal requirements.
This situation initially led to a standing question in
the DC.

The government charged that the church schools had no

standing to attack the federal program because the schools paid
only state FUTA taxes.

The DC rejected this argument, properly I

think, on the basis that the federal government was causing California to levy its state tax as it does.

\'

··\

See JS 5a-7a: 77a-78a.

,, '

7.

For standing purposes, then, the DC lumped together the state and
federal FUTA programs as part of one causal chain.
On page 2 of this memo, I have concluded that the DC's
judgment

should

FUTA statute.

be

read

to

invalidate portions of

On pages 2-5 of this memo,

the

federal

I have concluded that

the TIA should have barred the DC's relief against the California
FUTA tax

program.

The

question now

is whether

the

DC

relief

against the federal government provides a sufficiently independent basis for

this Court to rule on the merits of

amendment

challenge.

FUTA

Put

otherwise,

should

the first

the

federal

courts treat the federal and state tax programs as a single unit
for purposes of standing analysis, but as two distinct bundles of
statutes for purposes of a remedy analysis?
My reaction is that the characterization of the statutes
for

remedy

purposes

standing purposes.

should
That is,

parallel

the

characterization

for

if the church schools are to gain

standing by virtue of the fact that the federal and state programs are casually 1 inked,

then

I

think

that

the two programs

must be viewed as similarly linked for purposes of judging whether the relief against the federal government is distinct from the
relief against the state government.

In my view, the DC's decla-

ration that the federal program is unconstitutional cannot -- as
a matter of causality -- be separated from the DC's attack on the
state tax program.

I consequently believe that the fiA bars the
<.....

~

DC's entire remedy, and that none survives to provide a bridge to
------------~

<""<

the merits.

'\.·'

8.

*
The

*

*

*

SG offers an entirely different

reaching the first amendment merits.

justification for

He does not attempt to ar-

gue that any portion of the DC's remedy survived the TIA.

Rath-

er, his view is that the Court should reach the constitutional
merits notwithstanding the lack of DC jurisdiction "[i]n light of
the public interest in, and the Secretary's need for, a definitve
interpretation of 26

u.s.c.

§3309(b) ."

SG brief at 21.

This position strikes me as remarkable.

It is hard for

me to believe that the SG believes the Court is entirely free to
decide constitutional matters

upon which

a

DC has ventured an

opinion if this Court first determines that the DC lacked subject
matter

jurisdiction.

For

instance, suppose a DC found standing

where no standing properly existed.

Suppose further it then de-

clared a statute unconstitutional on controversial grounds.
pose

finally

that

this Court confronts the standing

decides that the DC erred.

Sup-

issue and

Is the Court really entirely free to

go on to agree the statute is invalid, even though no party to
the litigation in fact had standing to bring the challenge in the
first place?
I

have considerable

doubt

as

to the Court 1 s

deliever such a constitutional judgment.
SG relies are i;>lainly distinguishable
opinion in McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421

power

to

The cases on which the

in this-----r-egard.

u.s.

In your

21, 31-32 (1975), the

jurisdictional issue was whether a federal DC or a federal threejudge court should have entertained the issue in the first

in-

··.

9.

stance.

A similar dispute about the propriety of a three-judge

u.s.

court was at issue in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
(1975).

In neither

case was there a question

749, 763 n.8

(as there is in

this case) whether the suit should have been in federal court at
all.

Despite

the

expansive

language

in McLucas

stating

"that

this Court's jurisdiction under §1252 in no way depends on whether the district court had jurisdiction," 421

u.s.

at 31, I would

not expand the holdings in these cases to an instance in which
there is no basis for any federal jurisdiction.
I may be wrong about this Court's power to render constitutional pronouncements on matters that originally could not
have

been within

the

domain of

the

federal

courts.

If

so,

I

nonetheless believe that the Court still must possess some discretionary prudential power to decide when it is appropriate to
reach such issues.

Although I am sure that the SG indeed would

find it more convenient to have an immediate ruling on the constitutionality of FUTA's §3309, the need does not seem so compelling as to overcome the very sizable TIA jurisdictional defect in
the case.

As the St. Martin decision from last term illustrates,

the FUTA issue is a much-litigated one.
long to wait for a definitve ruling.
matter of discretion,
to

review

a

I doubt the SG will have
Therefore, at least as a

I urge you to decline the SG's invitation

constitutional holding

that

the

federal courts of

original jurisdiction lacked the power to deliver.
Conclusion

.•

10.
The
appeal.

Court has

§1252

But the DC lacked

the relief that it did.
this basis.

jurisdiction to hear

this

direct

jurisdiction under the TIA to award

Consequently the Court should reverse on

The Court should not engage in further constitution-

al discussion because it is unnecessary to the resolution of this
case.

r • •·
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california v. Grace Brethren Church

JUSTICE O'CONNOR de:ivered the opinion of the Court.

~

The principal question presented by the parties to this
appeal is whether certain state and federal statutes violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment 1 by requiring religious schools unaffili·-- -

.....c:·-

~-

ated with any church to pay unemployment insurance taxes.

--

·-- --

- - - --.

We do not reach this substantive question, however, holding instead that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 u.s.c. §1341,
dep:ive~ ~~~

of ·u

·~ction

to hear these

I

challenges.

Accordingly, we vacate the ju4gment below and

dismiss the appeal.
I

Last Term, in St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
South Dakota, 451 u.s. 772

(1981), this Court considered

statutory and constitutional challenges to provisions of
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 u.s.c. §§33011 The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses apply to the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 u.s. 296, 303
(1940) ; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 u.S. 1, 15
(1947).

2.

3311

(1976 ed.

involve

the

Supp.

&

IV).

Because the present claims

same provisions

that

we

interpreted

in St.

Martin, we recount only briefly the substance and legislative history of

the

relevant statutes before turning to

the facts in the present case.
A

In FUTA, 2 Congress has authorized a cooperative federalstate

scheme to provide benefits to unemployed workers.

The Act requires employers to pay an excise tax on wages
paid to employees

in "covered" employment, 3 but entitles

them to a credit of up to 90% of the federal tax for contributions

they have paid

into federally approved state

unemployment compensation programs. 4

One of the require-

ments for federal approval is that state programs

"cove~"

2FUTA was enacted originally as Title IX of the Social
Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 639 (1935).
3 see 26 u.s.c. §3301.
4 see 26 u.s.c. §3302.
Each state program receives
annual approval after the Secretary of Labor finds that it
complies with federal statutory standards. See 26 u.s.c.
§§3304 (a), (c). The federal standards for the state programs are contained in §§3304 and 3309.
If a state plan
complies with federal standards, the State is authorized
to receive a federal grant to administer the state plan.
See 29 u.s.c. §49d(b); 42 u.s.c. §501.

3.

certain broad categories of employment.
Until 1970, §3306 {c) {8) of FUTA excluded from the definition of covered employment

"service performed

in the

employ of a religious, charitable, educational, or other
[tax exempt] organization."
Stat. 984.

Pub. L. No. 86-778, §533, 74

As a consequence, such organizations were not

required to pay either federal excise taxes or state unemployment compensation taxes.

In 1970, Congress amended

FUTA to require state plans to cover employees of nonprofit organizations, state hospitals, and state institutions
of higher education, thus eliminating the broad exemption
available to nonprofit organizations. 5

See §3309 {a) {1) •

At the same time, Congress enacted §3309{b) to exempt from
5see Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-373, §104 {b) {1), 84 Stat. 697. Under §§3309 {a) {2)
and 3304{a) {6) {B), such nonprofit organizations were given
the option of either making the same contribution to the
state unemployment compensation fund required of other
employers, or reimbursing the fund for unemployment compensation payments actually made to the nonprofit organizations' former employees.
Although nonprofit organizations were covered by federally approved state unemployment compensation laws, they
continued to be exempt from the federal excise tax on
wages
because
the
definition
of
"employment"
in
§3306{c) {8), excluding services performed for such organizations, remained unchanged.

·.

., .

4.

mandatory state coverage a narrow class of religious and
educational employees, i.e., those serving
"(1) in the employ of (A) a church or convention or association of churches, or (B) an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a
church or convention or association of churches;
"(2) by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of
his ministry or by a member of a religious order
in the exercise of duties required by such order;
"(3) in the employ of a school which is not an
institution of higher education... • " 84 Stat.
698.
In 1976, Congress again amended FUTA, this time eliminating the substance of §3309(b) (3), thereby removing the
blanket exemption for school employees.

See Unemployment

Compensation

L.

Amendments

of

1976,

§llS(b) (1), 90 Stat. 2670. 6

Pub.

No.

94-566,

In order to maintain compli-

ance with FUTA, the States promptly amended their corresponding state programs.
§634.5(a), (b)

See,

~,

Cal. Un.

Ins. Code

(West Supp. 1981).
B

6 In its place, Congress substituted an unrelated provision.

-

--- . . - · -
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5.

The

plaintiffs

in

this

case,

a

number

of

California

churches and religious schools, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor from conditioning his approval of the California unemployment insurance program on its coverage of
the plaintiffs'

employees,

and

to enjoin the State from

collecting both tax information and the state tax. 7

For

the purposes of evaluating their statutory and consti tutional claims, the District Court divided the plaintiffs
into

three

classes

of

employers:

Category

I

represents

those schools that are part of the corporate structure of
a church or association of churches; Category II includes
schools that are separate corporations formed by a church
or

association

schools
poses,

of

that are
but

which

churches;

and

Category

"operated primarily for
[are]

not

operated,

III

includes

religious pur-

supervised,

con-

trolled or principally supported by a church or convention
or

association

of

churches,

i.e.,

an

independent,

non-

7This litigation grew out of two suits, one filed in
the District Court by Grace Brethren Church, et al. (Case
No. CV 79-93 MRP), and the other filed in state court by
the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod. The Secretary of Labor successfully removed the Lutheran Church case (Case
No. CV 79-162 MRP) to the District Court, which consolidated the cases for trial.

6

church affiliated

religious

school."

0

Supplemental Opin-

ion, reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement of the State of
California, et al., Appendix {J.S. App.) at 71. 8
On September 21, 1979, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the State restraining it from
collecting the state unemployment tax from the Category I
plaintiffs.

See J.S. App. 51.

The basis for the court's

order was its conclusion that the plaintiffs were exempt
from mandatory state coverage under §3309 {b) {1) , and alternatively, . that if they were not exempt under the terms
of FUTA, collection of the tax from the plaintiffs would
involve excessive governmental entanglement with religion,
in

violation

Amendment.
In

the

of

the

Establishment

Clause

of

the

First

See J.S. App. 58-65.
same opinion,

the District Court

rejected

the

Federal Government's argument that, because the state remedy was "plain, speedy and efficient," the Tax Injunction

8category I and II schools comprise schools from the
Lutheran Church case, see Order {filed April 3, 1981) ,
reprinted in J.S. App. 49, as well as some of the schools
from the Grace Brethren case.
See Order {filed April 3,
1981), reprinted in J .s. App. 46.
Category III schools
include only schools from the Grace Brethren case.
See
ibid.

7.

Act, 28

u.s.c.

junctive

§1341, 9 barred the court from granting in-

relief.

Considering

injunctive relief
eluded

that

first

the

from the state courts,

state

statutory

and

availability of
the court conconstitutional

provisions 10 made such relief "at best, uncertain."

J.S.

9 The Act provides:
"The district courts shall not enJOln, suspend
or restrain the assessment, levy or collection
of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State."
10 Cal. Un. Ins. Code §1851 (West 1972) provides:
"No injunction or writ of mandate or other legal
or equitable process shall issue in any suit,
action or proceeding, in any court against this
State or against any officer thereof to prevent
or enjoin the collection of any contribution
sought to be collected under this division."
Cal. Const., Art. XIII, §32 (West Supp. 1981) provides:
"No legal or equitable process shall issue in
any proceeding in any court against this State
or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the
collection of any tax.
After payment of a tax
claimed to be illegal, an action may be maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest,
in such manner as may be provided by the Legislature."
Despite

the

apparently unambiguous language
Footnote continued on next page.

of

these

8.

App. 66.

The court then concluded that a state suit for a

prov1s1ons, the District Court considered the availability
of injunctive relief only 11 uncertain 11 because of state
decisions indicating that injunctive relief may be available when the plaintiff challenges the state tax law as
being unconstitutional. See Las Animas & San Joaquin Land
Co. v. Preciado, 167 Cal. 580, 587 (1914) (injunction
available to restrain a school district from assessing
property taxes on land over which it has no authority):
Bueneman v. City of Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. 2d 405, 407
(1937) (statutory provision precluding courts from enjoining execution of public laws for public benefit does not
apply
to
claims
that
a
taxing
statute
is
unconstitutional).
More recent decisions, however, have held injunctive
relief to be precluded. See Modern Barber Colleges, Inc.
v. California Em lo ent Stabilization Commission, 31 Cal.
2d
,
(1
( ol 1ng t at a prov1s1on in the Unemployment Insurance Act, similar to §1851, prohibited injunctive relief, leaving the taxpayer only with the option
to pay the tax and seek a refund): Aronoff v. Franchise
Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 177, 180 (1963) (holding Cal. Const.
Art. XIII, §15 and Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §19081 preclude
issuance of an injunction to prevent collection of additional income taxes).
Relying on Aronoff, a district
court of appeal held that Cal. Const. Art. XIII, §32
(which, in 1974, became the successor to §15) and the corresponding statutory provision, Cal. Un. Ins. Code §1851,
prohibit the courts from enjoining the collection of unemployment insurance taxes.
Lorco Properties, Inc. v.
Department of Benefit Payments, 57 Cal. App. 3d 809, 815
(1976). Recently, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Board of Equalization, 27 Cal. 3d 277, 279 (1980) , the
California Supreme Court held that under Cal. Const. Art.
XIII, §32 a taxpayer was barred from seeking relief compelling the state tax board to adjust the taxpayer's real
property assessments. The court expressly held that there
were no equitable exceptions to this rule, id., at 282,
and reaffirmed the importance of the state policy to permit the uninterrupted collection of taxes.
Cf. Pacific
Footnote continued on next page.

9.

refund was an

inadequate

remedy

because

the plaintiffs

claimed not only that their property had been taken unlawfully, but that the "very process of determining whether
any tax is due at all results in a violation of their
First Amendment

rights."

J • S • App.

67 •

Because

this

First Amendment injury was "irreparable" once the taxes
had been collected, only an injunction against collection
of the tax could remedy the plaintiffs' claims.

Accord-

ingly, because there existed no "plain, speedy and eff icient" remedy in the state courts, the District Court coneluded that it had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief.
In a Supplemental Opinion filed June 2, 1980, the court
clarified its earlier opinion, stating expressly that the
preliminary injunction covered only Category I plaintiffs.
See J.S. App. 71.

For the same reasons that it had grant-

Motor Transport Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 28
Cal. App. 3d 230, 236 (1972) (noted without approval in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Board of Equalization,
supra, and holding that a taxpayer could seek declaratory
relief to challenge the validity of a tax regulation, but
that such relief could not "'prevent or enjoin' or otherwise hamper present or future tax assessment or collection
effort").

>

•

10.

ed the initial preliminary injunction, however, the court
extended the preliminary injunction to Category II plaintiffs.

The court continued to deny relief to the Category

III plaintiffs after concluding that they were not covered
by the statutory exemptions in §3309(b) and that the risk
of excessive governmental entanglement with religion was
too small to violate the Establishment Clause.

J.S. App.

77-79. 11
Finally, on April 3, 1981, the court filed a Second Supplemental Opinion ruling on all of the plaintiffs' motions
for

permanent injunctions enjoining the State from col-

lecting unemployment compensation taxes and the Federal
Government from conditioning approval of the state unemployment compensation programs on their inclusion of the
plaintiffs'

employees.

See

J.S.

App.

1.

Considering

first the statutory claims, the court concluded that Category

I

and Category

II

schools,

but

not Category

III

schools, are exempt from coverage under §3309(b) of FUTA
11The court also rejected the arguments offered by the
Category III plaintiffs that imposition of the tax violates the Free Exercise Clause, and that the unique statutory treatment of Category III plaintiffs violates equal
protection. J.S. 78.

11.

and the corresponding state provision, Cal. Un. Ins. Code
§634.5(a).

J • S • Ap P • 3 -15.12

The court also found that

the benefit entitlement decisions for employees of Category

III schools

risk

excessive

governmenta~

entanglement

with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.
the

court

held

that

J • S • App.

25 -33.13

"constitutional

Consequently,

considerations

bar

application of the scheme" to the Category III plaintiffs.
Id., at 33.
Based on these findings, the court issued orders perma-

1 2The court held alternatively that if the Secretary of
Labor's interpretation of §3309(b) were correct (i.e.,
Category I and II schools were not exempt from coverage) ,
then that provision violated the First Amendment because
it caused excessive governmental entanglement with religion by requiring "[i]ntrusive monitoring of the activities of employees of religious schools in order to determine whether or not those employees are exempt from unemployment
insurance
taxes"
and
by
requiring
" [ i] nvolvement of state officials in the resolution of
questions of religious doctrine in the course of determining the benefit eligibility of discharged employees of
religious schools." Order (filed April 3, 1982), reprinted in J.S. App. 45, 46; Order (filed April 3, 1982), ~
pr1nted in J.S. App. 49, 50.
13 The court again rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that statutory coverage of Category III schools violates
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, J.S. App.
16-25, and found it unnecessary to reach the Category III
plaintiffs' equal protection claim. J.S. App. 35.

12.

nently enjoining

the

federal

defendants

from

requiring

state unemployment insurance programs to cover Category I
and Category II schools as a precondition for federal approval of the state programs, J.S. App. 47, 51, and permanently enjoining the state defendants from "collecting, or
attempting to collect, unemployment compensation ••• taxes" from the Category I, II, or III schools.
47, 50.

J.S. App.

The court did not issue an injunction against the

federal defendants as to Category III schools because it
"has no information indicating what response, if
any, the Secretary will make to the Court's conclusion that the state defendants may not constitutionally impose the state unemployment compensation tax scheme on the Category 3 employees
of non-church affiliated schools.
If the
Secretary, in response to failure by the state
defendants to collect unemployment compensation
taxes on behalf of Category 3 employees, institutes decertification proceedings against the
State of California, the parties may apply to
this Court for further relief." Second Supplemental Opinion reprinted in J.S. App. 44 n. 39.
Following issuance of the court's injunction, this Court
decided St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, supra, holding that §3309(b) (1) (A) exempts Category I schools from mandatory coverage under the state unemployment

insurance

programs.

Although

no

Category

II

schools were before the Court in St. Martin, the Court

''

13.

in~ote

noted

that

"To est
ish exemption from FUTA, a separately
incorporated church school (or other organization)
must
satisfy
the
requirements
of
3309 (b) (l!}( B) :- (1) that the organization 'is
ope~ated primarily for religious purposes,' and
(2) that it is 'operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or
convention or association of churches.'"
451
u.s., at 782 n.l2.
As a result of this opinion, the Secretary of Labor reconsidered his position and decided that both Category I
and Category II schools are statutorily exempt from mandatory coverage under ..____
FUTA.
.___

·- ---------,....

----

Consequently ,~t:-;h-e-=
f e-d. . . e_ .r. ;a;:a.l de-

fendants, as well as the state defendants, have not ap· pealed the District Court's injunction involving Category
I and Category II schools, but only that part of the District Court order involving the Category III schools.l 4
14 see J .s. 11-12 (No. 81-31); Jurisdictional Statement
for the United States, et al., at 4 n.2, 6 n.5 (No. 81228). The Category III schools are parties only in the
Grace Brethren case, the suit originally filed in federal
court. See n. 7 supra.
The Grace Bretnren appellees filed a cross appeal (No.
81-455) cla1m1ng that the District Court erred in holding
that FUTA and the corresponding California statutory provisions do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. The cross appeal, however, is unnecessary to preserve this argument since under this Court's
Rule 10.5 "an appellee, without filing a cross-appeal,
Footnote continued on next page •

. •.•

14.

II
An

initial matter

requiring our

attention

is whether

______

,
this Court
has jurisdiction to hear these a peals. 15

Con-

gress has provided that
"Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from
an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or
oydero-~ t of the United States •••
iA'folding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in
any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which
the United States or any of its agencies, or any
officer or employee thereof, as such officer or
employee, is a party." 28 u.s.c. §1252.
The only possible doubt regarding our appellate jurisdiction under this provision is the requirement that the District Court hold "an Act of Congress unconstitutional."
In McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421

u.s.

21 (1975), we stated

that §1252 was an unambiguous exception to the policy of

[may] defend a judgment on any ground that the law and
record permit and that would not expand the relief he has
been granted."
The plaintiffs in the Lutheran Church case have filed an
brief in support of the JUdgment below. Because, however,
neither the State nor the Federal Government appealed from
that part of the judgment involving the Lutheran Church
plaintiffs, we do not address their claims.
15 In our order setting these cases for oral argument,
we postponed the question of jurisdiction until consideration of the merits. See 454 u.s.
(1981).

15.

minimizing

the mandatory docket of

this Court.

Indeed,

the "language of the statute sufficiently demonstrates its
purpose: to afford immediate review in this Court in civil
actions

to which

the United States or

its officers are

parties and thus will be bound by a holding of unconstitutionality."

Id., at 31.

Moreover, this Court has appel-

late jurisdiction under §1252 "when the ruling of unconstitutionality is made in the application of the statute
to a

particular

rather

circumstance,

challenged statute as a whole."

u.s.

100,

102-103

§1252, Act of Aug.
States v.

u.s.

561,

563

u.s.

a

(per

292, 293

jurisdiction even

as

(discussing

24, 1937,

(1972)

expressly declare a
long

Fleming v.

upon

the

Rhodes,

331

the predecessor

50 Stat. 751).

Christian Echoes National Ministry,

Darusmont, 449
vides

(1947)

than

curiam)~

(1981).

though

the

United

to

See United
Inc.,

404

States

v.

Finally, §1252 prolower

court did

not

federal statute unconstitutional, so

determination

that

a

statutory provision was

unconstitutional "was a necessary predicate to the relief"
that the lower court granted.

u.s.

United States v. Clark, 445

23, 26 n. 2 (1980) .16

Footnote(s) 16 will appear on following pages.

16.

__

In the present case, the District Court did not express"""":""--....

ly hold §3309 (b)

...............

of FUTA unconstitutional as applied to

the Category III appellees,l 7 but the effect of its sever-

-

-~

al opinions and orders was to make "the United States or
its officers ••• bound by a holding of unconstitutionality."

McLucas v. DeChamplain, supra, at 31.

while discussing

For example,

the Establishment Clause claim of the

Category III schools, the District Court held:
"Since such entanglement [involving the resolution of questions of faith and doctrine by secular tribunals] is inevitable during the benefit
eligibility determination process if religious
schools are brought within the scope of the unemployment compensation tax scheme, constitutional considerations bar the application of the
scheme to them."
Second Supplemental Opinion,
reprinted in J.S. App. 33 (emphasis added).
Examination of other portions of the court's opinion makes
clear that the court's use of the word "scheme" refers to

16 In Clark, the Court of Claims simply ordered relief
based on 1 ts earlier decision in another case.
In that
earlier decision, the court had declared the challenged
statutory provision unconstitutional. See Gentry v. United states, 212 Ct. Cl. 1, 546 F. 2d 343 (1976) , rehear1ng
denied, 212 Ct. Cl. 27, 551 F.2d 852 (1977).
17 see Order (filed April 3, 1981), reprinted in J.S.
App. 45, 46 (holding Cal. Un. Ins. Code §634.5(a) unconstitutional, but making no direct reference to §3309(b)).

-·- _.. ------.,.-----·------------ ·---·---·- -· . . .......... ... . . -

_,.._

-,..

· ----~ ...

17.

the combined federal and state provisions.
App.

26

(expressly referring

to

both

See e.g., J.S.

federal

and

state

statutorx provisions in discussing the "unemployment compensation scheme"}; J.S. App. 25 (referring to the intent
of Congress and the California legislature in discussing
the

"unemployment

tax

scheme"} •

Moreover,

the District

Court's analysis leading to its order holding the California provision unconstitutional is based solely on its understanding of the operation and effect of FUTA, which of
course

prompted

the

passage

statute in the first place. 18

of

the

corresponding

state

Cf. St. Martin Evangelical

Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, supra, at 780 n. 9 (holding that the Court could review the South Dakota Supreme

18 The court's analysis of Category I and II schools
also demonstrates that it believed FUTA, as applied to
Category III schools, to be unconstitutional. In its discussion of Category I and II schools, the court held that
if it were to follow the Secretary's interpretation of
§3309, i.e., if no exemption existed, then FUTA would be
unconstitutional as applied to those schools in part because of the excessive governmental entanglement in the
benefit eligibility hearing. See n. 12 supra. Since the
court also found an entanglement problem with respect to
benefit eligibility hearings for Category III schools, and
since there is no statutory exemption for those schools,
it follows that the District Court must have believed that
FUTA was unconstitutional as applied to the Category III
plaintiffs.

tI

~

: fl'

18.

Court's . interpretation of

its

unemployment compensation

tax statute because its "analysis depended entirely on its
understanding of the meaning of FUTA and the First Amendment").

Finally, in its Second Supplemental Opinion, the

court made clear that if the Secretary "institutes decertification proceedings against the State of California"
for failing to collect unemployment compensation taxes on
behalf of Category III employees, "the parties may apply
to this Court for

further

relief," which can only mean

injunctive relief against the Secretary.
39.

J.S. App. 44 n.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Sec-

retary is "bound by a holdin

.....____

that this
appeal.

of unconstitutionality," and

'--C ~has

jurisdiction under §1252 to hear this

--- - ----.....
....

III
As we noted above, the District Court enjoined the state
defendants from collecting state unemployment compensation
taxes from the Category III schools. 19

In the course of

19 No federal tax is involved in this case, for the services performed for Category III schools are exempted by
§3306 (c) (8) from the definition of employment for which
the federal excise tax must be paid.

,/

19.

granting this injunctive relief,

the court expressly re-

jected the Federal Government's argument that the Tax In-

----~--ju ction
Act, 28 u.s.c. §1341, deprived the court of jurisdiction.

See J.S.

App.

65-69.

Consequently,

reaching the merits of the appellees'
cide whether

before

claim, we must de-

the District Court correctly ruled that it

had jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act.
A

------

The Tax Injunction Act states simply that the district
courts "shall not enjoin ••• the ••• collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy
may be had in the courts of such State."

Accordingly, the

District Court was without jurisdiction to issue its injunction in this case unless the appellees had no "plain,
speedy and efficient remedy" in the state courts.
Last Term,
u.s.

503

in Rosewell

v.

LaSalle National Bank,

450

{1981), this Court had occasion to consider the

meaning of the "plain, speedy and efficient" exception in
the

Tax

Injunction

Act.

After

reviewing

previous

decisions 20 and the legislative history of the Act, 21 the

20see Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 u.s. 68, 74 {1976);
Footnote cont1nued on next page.
Footnote{s) 21 will appear on following pages.

20.

court

concluded

that

the

"plain,

speedy

and

efficient"

exception requires the "state-court remedy [to meet) certain minimal procedural criteria."
in

original).

"plain,

In

particular,

speedy and

efficient"

a

Id., at 512 (emphasis
state

only

if

court
it

remedy

"provides

is
the

taxpayer with a 'full hearing and judicial determination'
at which she may raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax."

Id., at 514 (quoting LaSalle National

Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 324, 312 N.E. 2d
252,

255-256

(1974)) • 22

Applying

these

considerations,

the Rosewell Court held that an Illinois tax scheme, re-

Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 u.s. 620, 625 (1946); Great
Lakes Dreage & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 u.s. 293, 300-301
(1943) •
21 see 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone);
s. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 {1937). The
Court also relied on the legislative history of the Johnson Act of 1934, 28 u.S .c. §1342 (prohibiting federal
court interference with orders issued by state administrative agencies to public utilities), on which the Tax Injunction Act was modeled.
22 see also 450 u.S., at 515 & n. 19; 517 (making clear
that some opportunity to raise constitutional objections
is the most important consideration); S. Rep. No. 1035,
75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 {1937) (under the Tax Injunction
Act, a "full hearing and judicial determination of the
controversy is assured. An appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States is available as in other cases").

- --- -·- ·------

... ~-

. ............ ---"--· ,...........--... -.,..,.,., ....... ................
~

21.

quiring the taxpayer to pay an allegedly unconstitutional
tax 23 and seek a refund through state administrative and
judicial procedures, was a

"plain,

speedy and efficient

remedy" within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act.
reaching

this holding,

In

the Court specifically relied on

legislative history demonstrating congressional awareness
that refunds were the exclusive remedy in many state tax
systems. 24

The Court believed that its holding would ad-

vance the principal purpose of the Act: "to limit drastically
with

federal
so

taxes."

district

important

a

court

jurisdiction

local concern as

to

interfere

the collection of

450 u.s., at 522.

The holding in Rosewell reflects not only Congress' express command in the Tax Injunction Act, but also the historical reluctance of the federal courts to interfere with
the operation of state tax systems.

As this Court stated

23 The plaintiff in Rosewell had claimed that requiring
payment of the county property tax violated her equal protection and due process rights.
24 see s. Rep. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937)
(state "statutes generally provide that taxpayers may contest their taxes only in refund actions after payment under protest"); H.R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
2 (1937).

''

22.

in Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1870), long
before enactment of the Tax Injunction Act:
"It is upon taxation that the several States
chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on
their respective governments, and it is of the
utmost importance to all of them that the modes
adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be
interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon
whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government,
and thereby cause serious detriment to the public.
"No court of equity will, therefore, allow its
injunction to issue to restrain their action,
except where it may be necessary to protect the
rights of the citizen whose property is taxed,
and he has no adequate remedy by the ordinary
processes of the law.
It must appear that the
enforcement of the tax would lead to a multiplicity of suits, or produce irreparable injury,
• • • beforzs the aid of a court of equity can be
invoked."
25 see also Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co. v.
Boise City, 213 u.s. 276, 282 (1909) (holding that "the
illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal
tax or imposition is not of itself a ground for equitable
relief in the courts of the United States. In such a case
the aggrieved party is left to his remedy at law, when
that remedy is as complete, practicable and efficient as
the remedy in equity"); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 u.S. 481, 488 (1913)
(holding that federal
courts will not enjoin the collection of unconstitutional
state taxes where the taxpayer "ha[s] a plain, adequate
and complete remedy" at law) ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co. v. Huffman, 319 u.s. 293, 299 (1943) (holding that the
same "considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes,
save in exceptional cases, require a like restraint in the
Footnote continued on next page.

l .

23.

\

Similarly,( JUSTICE BRENNAN set forth the policies underlying federql judicial~s traint in his concurring and dissenting opirii-on i n/Perez v. Ledesma, 401
17

(1971),

quoted

by

Court

with

u.s.

approval

82, 128 n.

earlier

this

Term: :
"If federal declaratory relief were available to
test state tax assessments, state tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and . taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law.
our ing the
pendency of the federal suit the collection of
revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State's
budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the
risk of taxpayer insolvency. Moreover, federal
constitutional issues are likely to turn on
questions of state tax law, which, like issues
of state regulatory law, are more properly heard
in the state courts."
Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Ass'n., Inc. v. McNary, 445 u.s. 100,
n. 6 (1981).
With these cases and principles in mind, we turn to the

use of the declaratory judgment procedure"); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 u.s. 100,
(1981) (holding that comity bars a taxpayer's damages
action brought in federal court under 42 u.s.c. §1983 to
redress allegedly unconstitutional tax assessments, in
part because the federal suit "would be no less disruptive
of [the State's] tax system than would the historic equitable efforts to enjoin the collection of taxes, efforts
which
were
early held
barred by considerations of
comity").

24.

California provisions to determine whether there exists a
"plain, speedy and efficient" state remedy for the appellees' claim.
B

There is no dispute that appellees in the present case
can

seek

through

a

refund

state

of

the

California

administrative . and

unemployment

judicial

tax

procedures.

Once a taxpayer has sought and been denied a refund from
the

appropriate

§§1176-1185

(West

state
1972

agency, ,see ·cal.
&

Supp.

un.· Ins.

Code

1981) , 26 he may file

an

action in Superior Court for a refund of the taxes paid,
raising

all

arguments

against

Cal. Un. Ins. Code §1241

the

validity of

(West Supp. 1981).

the

tax.

If the tax-

26 Apparently, California taxpayers cannot raise their
constitutional challenges in the administrative tax refund
proceeding unless an appellate court already has sustained
such a challenge.
See Cal. Const. Art. III, §3.5 (West
Supp. 1981), which provides in part that
"An administrative agency .•• has no power:
" (a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or
refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it
being unconstitutional unless an appellate court
has made a determination that such statute is
unconstitutional;
"(b) To declare a statute unconstitutional."

\'

25.

payer is unsuccessful at trial, he may appeal the decision
to higher state courts and ultimately seek review in this
Court.

Nothing in this scheme prevents the taxpayer from

"rais [ ing]
tax"

any and all constitutional objections to the

in the state courts.

Bank, supra, at 514. 27
lees'

Rosewell v. LaSalle National

Moreover, assuming that the appel-

constitutional claims are meritorious, an issue on

which we express no view, there is every reason to believe
that once

a

------- -

----

state appellate court has declared the tax
-unconstitutional the appropriate state agencies will re--~

27 significantly, the California administrative and judicial scheme for challenging a tax assessment is remarkably similar to the Illinois scheme that we upheld in
Rosewell as "plain, speedy and efficient." See 450 u.s.,
at 508-509 & nn. 6-7.
In fact, the California tax scheme
is more favorable to the taxpayer than the Illinois scheme
in that it requires the State to pay interest on improperly collected taxes.
See Cal. Un. Ins. Code §1242 (West
Supp. 1981)
This Court has not hesitated to declare a state refund
provision inadequate to bar federal relief if the taxpayer's opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the
state proceedings is uncertain.
In Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 u.s. 620 (1946) , the taxpayer could not ra1se
h1s constitutional challenge in the administrative proceedings, and appeal to the state courts was discretionary
with those courts.
Consequently, because "there [was]
such uncertainty concerning the New Jersey remedy as to
make it speculative," id., at 625, the Court held that the
taxpayer could seek declaratory relief in federal court.

26.

spect that declaration.
v.

See Pacific Motor Transport Co.

State Bd. of Equalization,

(1972)

(noting

that while

28 Cal.

App.

"relief

afforded may not

the

3d 230,

236

'prevent or enjoin' or otherwise hamper present or future
tax assessment or collection effort •••

[i]t will be pre-

sumed that the governmental agency will respect a judicial
declaration concerning a regulation's validity").

Accord-

ingly, it appears that Rosewell is directly applicable to
the present case, and that the District Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appellees' claims.
The appellees contend, however, that the California refund

procedures

efficient
only

by

do not

remedy"

constitute

because

injunctive

their

relief,

and

a

"plain,

claims

can

speedy and
be

remedied

that such relief

is un-

available in California courts to restrain the collection
of state taxes.
necessary,
judicial

the

See n.
appellees

review,

recordkeeping,
see Cal. Un.

the

10 supra.
claim,
employer

registration,

and

Injunctive relief

is

because

prior

to state

must

meet

certain

reporting

requirements,

Ins. Code §§1085, 1086, 1088, 1092, and po-

tentially is subject to administrative benefit eligibility
hearings 28 in violation of the appellees' First Amendment

Footnote(s) 28 will appear on following pages.

-

rights.

27.

The appellees thus fear that their constitutional

rights will be violated before they have an opportunity to
challenge the constitutionality of the unemployment tax
scheme in state court.
This argument is unpersuasive.

First, nothing in the

California scheme precludes the appellees from challenging
the unemployment tax before a benefit eligibility hearing
is held for one of their former employees.

As soon as an

employer makes its first payment to the state unemployment
insurance fund,

it may file for a refund and, after ex-

hausting state administrative remedies,

seek a

judicial

determination of the constitutionality of the tax. 29

If

28 under Cal. Un. Ins. Code §1256, a former employee
can collect unemployment benefits only if he has not been
dismissed for "misconduct" or "left his most recent work
voluntarily without good cause."
29 Part of the appellees' argument for the necessity of
injunctive relief rests on the premise that payments to
the state fund are made only after a benefit eligibility
hearing has been held. Under 26 u.s.c. §§3309 {a) (2) and
3304 (a) (6) (B), however, the States are required to give
nonprofit organizations, including the appellees, the option either of making regular contributions to the state
unemployment insurance fund or of reimbursing the fund for
payments actually made to the employers' former employees.
The nonprofit organizations are not required to choose the
reimbursement method, however, and can make regular payments to the fund in advance of any employee being disFootnote continued on next page.

28.

the

employer

ultimately prevails

on

his

constitutional

argument, the state taxing· authorities can be expected to
respect that court's holding in future administrative proceedings.

See Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Board

of Equalization, supra, at 236.

Thus, before any entan-

glement from the benefit eligibility hearings occurs, the
appellees should be able to challenge the constitutionality of the state unemployment insurance taxes.
Second,

while

an

employer

may

be

subject

to

some

recordkeeping and reporting requirements, or even a benefit

eligibility hearing,

pending

the

resolution of its

constitutional claims in state court, it will be subject
to the same burdens even if it seeks relief from the federal courts.

Thus, whatever harm the appellees may suffer

pending resolution of their constitutional claims,

that

harm is not reduced by seeking relief in federal court.
Stated differently,

there are no apparent advantages to

federal court relief that make state court remedies less
than "plain, speedy and efficient."30

charged.
Footnote(s} 30 will appear on following pages.

\

29.

Finally, we must keep in mind that at the time that it
passed

the Tax

Injunction Act,

Congress was

well

aware

that refund procedures were the sole remedy in many States
for

unlawfully collected

taxes.

See

s.

Rep.

No.

1035,

75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937): H.R. Rep. No. 1053, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937).
tion

for

taxpayers

Carving out a special excep-

raising First Amendment claims would

undermine significantly Congress' primary purpose "to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so
tion of taxes."
at 522. 3 1

~ tant

a local concern as the collec-

Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, supra,

Because we do~ believe that Congress intend-;;----~

~

ed federal injunctions to disrupt state tax administration
when state refund procedures are available, we

d~

to

----------------------------3°our conclusion that the state court remedy is plain,
speedy and efficient is reenforced by our observation that
it took the appellees in this case over two years to obtain injunctive relief.
31In addition, there seems to be no principled basis
for limiting the appellees' argument to First Amendment
claims.
Any employer required to pay state taxes in a
manner allegedly violating the Equal Protection Clause,
for example, might argue that the absence of state injunctive relief permitted the infliction of an irreparable
injury that could be remedied only by a federal injunction.

30.

find an exception in the Tax Injunction Act for the appellees' claims. 32 Accordingly, because the appellees could
i

seek a refund of their state unempioyment insurance taxes,
and thereby obtain state judicial review of their constitutional claims,
was "plain, speedy

-

hat their remedy under state law
efficient" within the meaning of

the Tax Injunction Act, and consequently, that the District Court had no jurisdiction to issue injunctive or
declaratory relief.~
32we also reject the appellees' argument to the extent
that it assumes that the state courts will not protect
their constitutional rights. As we stated in another context, "we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a
general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional
rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several
States. State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to
uphold federal law." Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465, 494
n. 35 (1976).
33 The state defendants also argue that because the Federal Government is an indispensable party to this action,
and could not be compelled to submit to state court jurisdiction, the state courts could not afford the appellees
complete relief. Consequently, the state defendants reason, the Tax Injunction Act does not deprive the District
Court of jurisdiction. See Brief for State of California,
at 35. The error in this argument is its premise: as St.
Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, sup~
demonstrates, the Federal Government need not be a party
in order for the appellees to litigate their statutory and
constitutional claims.

31.

c

\

Despite

the

absence

of

jurisdiction

in

the

District

Court, the federal defendants urge us to consider the merits of

the appellees'

First Amendment claims because of

the "public interest in, and the Secretary's need for, a
def ini ti ve interpretation of 26 U.S .c.
for

the United States, at 21.

§3309 (b) • "

The Government bases this

argument on our decision in McLucas v.
u.S.

21,

32

(197 5) ,

Brief

DeChamplain,

421

in which we held that "whether the

District Court did or did not have jurisdiction to act,
this case is properly here under §1252."

See also Wein-

berger v. Salfi, 422 u.s. 749, 763 n. 8 (1975).
The Government's argument is unavailing, however, for in
McLucas and Salfi, some federal trial court had jurisdiction,34 whereas in the present case, no federal district
court had jurisdiction.

If this Court were nonetheless to

reach the First Amendment issues presented in this appeal,
the litigants would have sidestepped neatly Congress' in-

34 In both of those cases, the question was whether a
single district judge or a three-judge district court had
jurisdiction. In the present case, by contrast, the issue
is whether the federal courts or the state courts have
jurisdiction.

32.

tent

and our

longstanding policy "to limit drastically"

federal interference in the administration of state taxes
when

a

"plain,

available. 35

speedy

and

efficient"

state

remedy

is

Accordingly, we do not reach the appellees'

First Amendment claims.
The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the
case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

So ordered.

35 similarly, the state defendants' reliance on Williams
v. Zbaraz, 448 u.S. 358 (1980) , is misplaced.
In that
case, the District Court had held unconstitutional a federal statute that the parties had not challenged. We held
that because there was no case or controversy on that issue, the District Court had exceeded its jurisdiction for
that issue.
Id., at 367.
Nevertheless, because of the
holding of unconstitutionality we concluded that we had
jurisdiction under §125 2 to "review the 'whole case.'"
Id., at 368.
That review, however, was restricted to
those issues over which the District Court had had jurisdiction, and we vacated that portion of the judgment holding the federal statute unconstitutional. Ibid.
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June 2, 1982

Re:

81-31~

228~ 455 - California v.
Grace Brethren Church

Dear Sandra:

..i

As soon as I can get to it, I will be
circulating a dissent.
Respectfully,

)~L
Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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California v. Grace Brethren
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Dear Sandra:
I am generally in agreement with your circulation of
June 1 in this case. However, as I noted at conference,
this case clearly presented the question, long left undecided in our cases, whether the Tax Injunction Act itself
bars federal district court actions for declaratory relief. As recently reaffirmed earlier this term in both
the Court's opinion and the concurring opinion in FAIR
Assessment, Great Lakes v. Huffman re s ted not on the view
that declarqtory relief was barred by the Tax Injunction
Act itself, but on the view that such relief was barred
by those principles of comity which were encapsulated in
the TIA.
Here, declaratory relief was clearly sought in the
district court~ indeed, it appears to have been granted
below. And the issue whether the Tax Injunction Act itself bars declaratory relief, or whether the bar is simply one of comity, is necessarily reached on the facts of
this case. The TIA is jurisdictional~ its bar cannot be
waived.
But if the bar to declaratory relief in federal
court is purely one of comity, it of course can be waived
by the State~ indeed, as I read the record it was consciously waived here by the State which had very strong
reasons for wishing to have the litigation proceed in
federal court where the United States would be a party.
Of course, as I said at conference, I have little
difficult co
u ·
hat the Tax In'unction Act, reasonably construed, does 1n fact bar
f
s of an 'cipat ~ lief--lnc u 1ng declaratory judgment
suits.
Do you think you might accomodate such a holding
in your opinion for the Court?
Sinc,erely,

~~l

W.J.B., Jr.
Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 2, 1982

Re:

Nos. 81-31, 81-228, 81-455

California v. Grace Brethren

Dear Bill,

I

I agree with you that declaratory relief was sought in
the district court and was granted below.
I have no
objection to addressing directly the issue of whether the
Tax Injunction Act itself bars declaratory relief or whether
the bar is one of comity, provided that there is no objection
by the majority who voted at Conference to vacate and remand.
My notes do not reflect that others expressed a view on this
point at Conference.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 3, 1982

Re:

81-31, 81-228 & 81-455 - California v.
Grace Brethren Church

Dear Sandra,
Bill Brennan's point is well taken, I
think.

With that change, I would join your

opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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81-31, 81-228, 81-455 California v . Grace Brethren

Dear Sandra:
I agree with Bill Brennan that it would be
constructive to hold that the Tax Injunction Act also bare
declaratory relief.

Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 7, 1982
(81-31 -·California, et al. v. Grace Brethren Church
(

Re:

(81-288- U.S. v. Grace Brethren Church
(

(81-455 - Grace Brethren Church v. U.S.

Dear Sandra:
I join and I have no problems with Bill
Brennan's suggestion.

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

;rune 8, 1982

81-31 California v. Grace Brethren rhurch

Dear Sandra:
1 am still with you.

Si.ncer.eJv,

Justice O'Connor

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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:.ltil!p:n.gtllt4 ~. <q. 2!lbl~.;l
CHAMBERS OF

June 9, 1982

JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR .

RE:

No. 81-31

California v. Grace Brethren Church

Dear Sandra:
I

agr~e

with your recirculation of June 8.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

J\.llle 9, 1982
Re:

Nos. 81-31, 81-228, 81-455
Grace Bretheran Church

California v.

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
/ t ~,...,/.

Sincerely,

A/
Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 9, 1982

Re:

Nos. 81-150 and 81-546-Northern Pipeline v.
Marathon Pipe Line and U.S. v. Marathon Pipe Line

Dear Bill:
Plea?e join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

.;§u:prtmt <!Jourt of tqt 'Jltnittb .:%taus
'lllasirtngtttn, p. <g. 2ll.?J!-~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 9, 1982 , · · . ., "

Re:

No. 81-31-California v. Grace Brethren Church

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

t-

7-M,

T.M.

Justice O'Connor
cc:

: ··.~

The Conference

~n;rrtmt
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~~n.~.<!J. 20~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 15, 1982

Re: 81-31, 81-228 and 81-455 California v. Grace Brethren Church

Dear Sandra,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice O'Connor
· Copies to the Conference
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[To accompany S. 1551]
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It

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill
(S. 1551) to amend section 24 of the Judicial Code, after consideration
thereof, report the bill favorably to the Senate with the recommendation that it do pass.
S. 1551 amends section 24 of the Judicial Code, as amended, with
respect to the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States
over suits relating to the collection of State taxes. The bill reads as
follows: ,
·

•

•·

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the first paragraph of section 24 of the
Judicial Code, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, no district court
ehaU have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment,
levy, or collection of any tax imposed by or pursuant to the laws of any State
'IVt here a. plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in
he courts of such State."
.
.
.
. SEc. 2. The provisions of this Act shall not affect suits commenced in the
~trict courts, either originally or by removal, prior to its pasasge; and all such
~u1ts shall be continued, proceedings therein had, appeals therein taken, and
ltUhdgments therein rendered, in the same manner and with the same effect as if
is Act had not been passed.
·
· -

This legislation does not introduce a n~w principle, since the Congress
has passed statutes of similar import. 1lt is the common practice for
statutes of the various States to forbid actions in State court~ to
~njoin the collection of State and county taxes unless the tax law is
tnvalid or the property is exempt from taxation, and these statutes
generally provide th~yers may contesf thei:r;_ taxes -only in
tef~nd actions after payment under protest. - This type of State
legisl~siole for the States and their various agencies
to survive while long-drawn-out tax litigation is in progress. If those
to wh()m the Federal courts are open may secure injunctive relief .

I

• ,.. r"' .

2
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THB JUDI CIAL CODE

g.ainst the collection of taxes, the highly unfair pi.c ture is priented
the citizen..oUhe-.State being reguireclto pay first _!1n_llhen litigate
bile tliose privileged to sue in the Federal courts ne~d a.]~at
hey _~o~se . and wi£l~ho1d the ·balance during t~e pe.tio. . ~itigation.
Tlie ex1stmg practice of the F ederal courts m entertammg tax-in.
junction suits against State officers makes it possible for foreign corp 0 •
rations doing business in such States to withhold from them and their
governmental subdivisions', taxes in such vast amounts and for such
long periods of time as to seriously disrupt State O:nd county finances.
The pressing needs of these Sta.t es for this tax money is so great that
in many instances they have been compelled to compromise these
suits, as a result of which substantial portions of the tax have been ·
lost to the States without a judicial examination into the real merits
..
.
of the controversy. r .
The attorney general of each of the 'following States has seen fit to
urge passage of this bill: Alabama, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia
and Wyoming.
. '
It should be emphasized that the bill does not take away any equit( able right of the taxpayer or deprive him of his d(ly in court. Specific
provision is made that the suit will not be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Federal district court except where there is a plain
speedy, and efficient remedy at law or in equity in the courts of th~
State . . A full hearing an. d judicial determination_pUJ.:!SLC4>11t.r.QY.grsy
{ is assured. An appeal to t_E.~J)up!~~I_nELQQu_rt _.oUh.e Unitcd~s is
av.ail able-as til' other cases.
·
·
· The- propriety of this kind of legislation was fully discussed by the
Senate Judiciary Committee when the so-called Johnson Act of May
14, 1934, S. 752, Public, No. 222, was favorably reported and subsequently passed by the Congress.
.
·
The report on the Johnsen bill pointed out that the continuance of
the unjust discrimination between citizens of the State and foreign
corporu.tions doing business in such State has been the cause of much
controversy. The controversies arising out of the use of the injunctive process in State tax cases would be eliminated by the passage
of this bill. ·
The question of the constitutionality of this type of legislation was
also discussed in the report on the Johnson bill, which pointed out
decisions of the Supreme Court which removed any question of the
right of Congress to limit jurisdiction of Federal district courts in
matters of th.is kind. There being no question of the constitutional
right of the Congress to enact such legislation, the only remaining
1
question is that of the :2ropriety and wisdom of such legislation.
The district courts of the United States derive their jurisdiction wholly
from the authority of Congress, as was clearly pointed out in Kline v.
Burke Construction Company (260 U.S. 226 (1922)). In that case the
Supreme Court held that Congress might give, withhold or restrict
such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond
the boundaries fixed by the Constitution. As far back as 1799 the
case of Turner v. Bank of America, Mr. Justice Chase, SMaking for
the Supreme Court, laid at rest any question of the right of CO'ngress to
enact th.is sort of legislation.
·

Since th
upheld in a
which revi1
in the case
(9 Fed. Sui
A conteJ
legislation
Ulore prom
to, impelst

!

I

·.,

AMENDii.O
..... THE JUDICIAL CODE

3

Since the Johnson Act was passed its constitutionality has been
upheld in an opinion in the United States District Court of Mississippi,
which reviewed at length the constitutional basis for such legislation
in the case of Mississippi Power & Light Company v. City of Jackson
(9 Fed. Supp. 564).
A contemplation of the wisdom and desirability of this sort of
legislation rising out of the compelling needs of many States for a
more prompt disposition of tax controversies of the character referred
to, impels us to recommend the prompt passage of S. 1551.
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upheld in an opinion in the United States District Court of Mississippi,
which reviewed at length the constitutional basis for such legislation
in the case of Mississippi Power & Light Company v. City of Jackson
(9 Fed. Supp. 564).
A. contemplation of the wisdom and desirability of this sort of
legislation rising out of the compelling needs of many States for a
more prompt disposition of tax controversies of the character referred
to, impels us to recommend the prompt passage of S. 1551.
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